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Beyond Rationality: A Sociological 
Construction of the World Trade Organization 
SUNGJOON CHO*
 
 
This Article critiques the rational-institutional analysis of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) that Gregory Shaffer and Joel Trachtman present, and 
proposes an alternative “sociological” framework. The Article notes that 
rationalism, although a powerful heuristic of the WTO’s operation, inevitably 
overlooks the WTO’s rich social dimensions and thus leaves behind several 
theoretical blind spots, such as the lack of any satisfying explanation on 
institutional evolution and development concerns. In an attempt to address these 
blind spots, the Article offers a sociological-communitarian paradigm that 
emphasizes cognitive elements, such as ideas, norms, and discourse, to explain 
the social dynamic within the WTO. Under this new framework, an 
institutional ontology of the WTO is defined not as a contract (Gesellschaft), 
but as a community (Gemeinschaft). Within the WTO’s community, its 
members convey their thoughts and arguments (ideas) through an iterative and 
ritualized process (discourse) and eventually institutionalize those ideas as 
norms. The Article also reinterprets rational choice narratives originally 
provided by Shaffer and Trachtman in a way so that the rationalist-
institutional analysis converges with the sociological-communitarian paradigm. 
The Article concludes that the new paradigm can help WTO members adjust 
their ways of thinking and generate new ideas and proposals to address some of 
the chronic problems that the WTO confronts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since its highly anticipated launch in 1995, after eight years of 
negotiation under the Uruguay Round, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) has been prized as the single most successful example of 
international cooperation.1 Both the size of its membership2 and its 
dispute resolution caseload3 have continuously increased. Its ever-growing 
prominence also commands much academic attention. New journals4 as 
well as academic programs5
A plethora of scholarly projects devoted to the WTO notwithstanding, 
relatively few have ever tackled a fundamental inquiry: What constitutes the 
WTO, and how should we understand it?
 that specialize in the study of the WTO are 
frequently commissioned.  
6
                                                          
1. Gideon Rachman, A Bad Year for Diplomats, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 2008, at 73. 
 Beneath this seemingly polemical 
2. The WTO’s predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was 
established with only twenty-three contracting parties; the number of participatory parties rose to 128 
when the WTO was created. Currently, the WTO has a total of 153 members. Members and Observers, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, (Sept. 29, 2011, 9:46 AM), http://tinyurl.com/2vons.  
3. As of September 20, 2011, a total of 427 disputes have been filed with the WTO. Dispute 
Settlement: The Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, (Sept. 29, 2011, 9:47 AM), 
http://tinyurl.com/3obqu. 
4. See, e.g., JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, available at 
http://tinyurl.com/4xbd4b4; WORLD TRADE REVIEW, available at http://tinyurl.com/3q5vn9e. The 
journals were launched in 1998 and 2002, respectively, and mainly publish scholarly literature 
discussing WTO issues.  
5. See, e.g., The Academy of International Trade and Investment Law 2011, INST. OF EUROPEAN 
STUDIES OF MACAO (June 8, 2011, 10:39 AM), http://tinyurl.com/3ele4up (announcing launch of 
academic program). 
6. As to the few scholars who have considered this question, see Deborah Z. Cass, The 
‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional 
Development in International Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 39 (2001); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: 
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question lurks a fundamental paradigmatic concern. That is, any answer to 
this inquiry will always rely on a certain framework (methodology) or a set 
of assumptions; the basis on which inquirers structure their perceptions of 
the WTO necessarily depend on their initial paradigmatic views.7
In their seminal article, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO, 
Gregory Shaffer and Joel Trachtman attempt to understand the WTO 
largely under a rationalist (or law and economics) framework.
 
8 In 
particular, they draw on the comparative institutional analysis,9 which 
focuses on the availability of alternative choices in understanding the 
development of a particular institution. At broad brush, the comparative 
institutional analysis is derived from the tradition of “new institutional 
economics,” espoused by Douglas North and Oliver Williamson, whose 
central theme is that all institutions are invariably accompanied by 
transaction costs and therefore can be replaced by alternatives.10
Shaffer and Trachtman view the WTO as a welfare-maximizing 
contract
 
According to this approach, the WTO’s operation depends on its 
members’ participation in its various institutions, which is in turn 
determined by the costs and benefits of such participation. 
11 in which various institutional choices are reduced to individual 
preferences and economic welfare considerations.12
                                                                                                                                      
The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647 (2006); Andrew 
T. F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study 
of the International Trade Regime, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 81 (2006); Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the 
WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 623 (2006). 
 The rationalist 
7. Brian C. Rathbun, Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial 
Concept in International Relations Theory, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 533, 536, 549 (2007). 
8. Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO, 52 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 103, 105 (2011). 
9. Regarding the comparative institutional analysis generally, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT 
ALTERNATIVES (1994) (describing which institutions — markets, legislatures, or courts — can best 
implement social policy goals); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS (2001) (arguing that the 
interactions between law-making institutions molds the supply of and demand for law). See also 
Daniel H. Cole, Taking Coase Seriously: Neil Komesar on Law’s Limits, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 261 
(2004) (reviewing NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS (2001)); David A. Luigs, Imperfect Alternatives: 
Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1559 (1995) (reviewing NEIL 
K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994)). 
10. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 107–08; see generally DOUGLAS C. NORTH, 
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (James Alt & Douglas 
North eds., 1990) (defining “institutions” broadly); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) (using the “transaction cost” approach in analyzing 
institutions). Thus, the authors’ focus on institutional “alternatives” is derived from both the 
institutional economics approach and the “comparative institutional analysis” touted by Neil 
Komesar. See generally KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 9; KOMESAR, LAW’S 
LIMITS, supra note 9. 
11. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 111. 
12. Id. at 105–07. In their article, Shaffer and Trachtman define an institutional choice as an 
option within a payoff matrix that is calculated according to a form of welfare (cost-benefit) analysis. 
Id.  
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assumptions in Shaffer and Trachtman’s argument, which characterize a 
state’s action as a calculated decision,13 support a “functional” paradigm. 
The WTO, as a corporate collectivity, is regarded as an instrument 
designed to achieve members’ common interests within the meaning of 
Talcott Parson’s idea of “goal gratification.”14 According to this paradigm, 
the WTO is a contract (Gesellschaft) in which collective guidelines steer 
members’ behaviors in a way that preserves their original contractual 
relationship.15 Similarly, existing WTO norms and other institutional 
properties, according to the rationalist/functional paradigm, represent 
“structural and constraining features” that program and determine 
members’ behaviors.16
The problem with the rational choice model or rational institutionalism 
is that it replaces real actors whose rationality is in fact bounded
 
17 with 
flawlessly rational (hypothetical) actors.18 As a result, although the 
underlying logic of Shaffer and Trachtman’s thesis may appear rational, it 
also represents a certain myth in that such logic is constructed within a 
narrow set of assumptions and is not axiomatic in and of itself.19 Given 
the reality of trade negotiations, titular institutional choices are hardly 
deliberate or even calculating. Theories relying on the power of rational 
choice and efficiency do not properly characterize most political bargains 
because those bargains are often negotiated on a highly contingent basis 
across issue areas,20
                                                          
13. James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political 
Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 736–39 (1984) (characterizing utilitarianism as an ideology interpret 
actions as based on calculated decisions).  
 whereas the notion of efficiency is often theorized 
14. Guy E. Swanson, An Organizational Analysis of Collectivities, 36 AM. SOC. REV. 607, 619–20 
(1971). 
15. Id. at 620. 
16. Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 
INT’L ORG. 325, 326 (1996). 
17. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern State: Keep the 
Bathwater, But Throw out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 315 (2002). The idea of “bounded 
rationality” has alternatively been described as “cognitive loafing” or “cognitive illusions.” Id. at 315–
16. According to the bounded rationality argument, public officials may be motivated by objectives 
aside from mere reelection (“hacks”). Id. at 311, 322, 336. 
18. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 132; see generally BO ROTHSTEIN, SOCIAL TRAPS AND 
THE PROBLEM OF TRUST (2005); FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GAMES REAL ACTORS PLAY (1997); Vivien A. 
Schmidt, Taking Ideas and Discourses Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the 
Fourth “New Institutionalism,” 2 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (2009).  
19. W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS (2d ed. 
1987); Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 
105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 410–11 (1999). Additionally, the rational choice model (law and economics) is 
often criticized for holding unrealistic assumptions as to “perfect foresight and complete information 
about the future.” Andrew Keay & Hao Zhang, Incomplete Contracts, Contingent Fiduciaries and a Director’s 
Duty to Creditors, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 141, 156 (2008). 
20. Robert Howse, Do the World Trade Organization Disciplines on Domestic Subsidies Make Sense?: The 
Case for Legalizing Some Subsidies, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 85 (Kyle W. Bagwell et al. eds., 2009). 
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around a specific issue. Thus, in a normal political bargaining situation, ex 
ante rational choices may be either nonexistent or ambiguous.  
Rationalism’s theoretical omission is revealing. It ignores the critical 
issue of the social formation of preferences and this phenomenon’s 
potential to implement change, because it assumes that actors are rational 
and seek to maximize only preprogrammed profits or self-interests.21 A 
paradigm premised on rationalism cannot conceive of the idea that WTO 
institutions22 can shape and change what WTO members think of 
themselves and the nature of their perceived interests through “frames of 
reference” and “normative orientations.”23 Under the rationalist paradigm, 
we cannot adequately explain how WTO members build their self-
understandings (identities), as distilled from their own social practices.24 
This is an unfortunate omission in that it hinders us from understanding 
the rich complexity of existing social, in particular “discursive,” 
dimensions within the WTO.25
This paradigmatic deficit of rationalism translates into certain 
theoretical blind spots. First, if the WTO is viewed as a functional tool 
(contract) for members, then it is assumed that its terms are predetermined 
and there exists very little room for institutional change. Change is either 
“assumed away”
 
26 or viewed as a reprogramming of an institution due to 
unexpected external shocks.27
                                                          
21. K. Thelen & S. Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective, in STRUCTURING 
POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 8, 16 (Kathleen Thelen & 
Sven Steinmo eds., 1992). 
 Second, the rationalist fear of inefficient or 
excessive delegation to the judiciary is accompanied by an interpretive 
obsession with deriving the ordinary meaning of texts arising under the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This textualist determinism, 
which is characterized by an assumption of preprogrammed institutional 
choices, largely overlooks the possibility that WTO norms can endogenously 
emerge through the social interactions and discourse amongst actors 
within the WTO. 
22. It should be noted that sociologists emphasize the “social and cognitive” aspects of 
institutions, while rational-choice scholars focus on their “structural and constraining” features. 
Finnemore, supra note 16, at 326. 
23. THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. 
DiMaggio eds., 1991); Thomas A. Koelble, The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology, 27 
COMP. POL. 231 (1995).  
24. Schmidt, supra note 18, at 9.  
25. Alexander E. Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations, 41 INT’L ORG. 335, 
359 (1987). 
26. Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast, Intersections Between Historical and Rational Choice 
Institutionalism, in PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS: POINTS OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN 
HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 7 (Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast 
eds., 2005). 
27. Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and Innovation 
in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 662 (2006). 
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Third, Shaffer and Trachtman’s rationalist premise leaves normative 
considerations, such as participation, transparency, accountability, and 
legitimacy, largely unaddressed. While the authors acknowledge that these 
considerations both “will often be valued in themselves” and contribute to 
rationalist goals (such as “articulating and furthering other individual 
preferences”), they do not elaborate what those “values” are.28 Fourth, as 
Shaffer and Trachtman admit, any international political process is 
vulnerable to various “biases” due to the asymmetrical distribution of 
power and resources among the WTO members.29 Both in a negotiation 
and a litigation setting, powerful and resourceful bureaucrats and interest 
groups from developed countries tend to prevail over developing 
countries.30
The aforementioned paradigmatic limitations endemic to the rationalist 
approach expose its “disciplinary isolation”
 As a positive approach, which contrasts a normative one, 
rationalism suggests no solution to the normative concerns related to this 
inability of many developing countries to properly represent their 
positions. 
31 and call for a new 
framework. In particular, both international relations scholars and 
international lawyers have recently begun to take seriously various social 
dimensions, such as the constructive role of ideas and norms, of the 
political and legal institutions of an international organization.32 This 
Article argues that a “sociological” (or “constructivist” in international 
relations theories) approach to understanding the WTO33 can remedy 
those theoretical blind spots left by the rationalist paradigm. The 
sociological approach challenges main rationalist assumptions, such as the 
idea of fixed preferences, by emphasizing cognitive elements, such as 
ideas, norms, and discourse, in explaining the social dynamic within an 
international organization.34
Under this new framework, an institutional ontology of the WTO is 
defined not as a contract (Gesellschaft), but as a community (Gemeinschaft).
 
35
                                                          
28. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 
 
8, at 109.  
29. Id. at 127. 
30. Id. at 144; Joseph A. Conti, Learning to Dispute: Repeat Participation, Expertise, and Reputation at the 
World Trade Organization, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 625, 626–27 (2010) (observing salient disparities in 
the levels of member participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings). 
31. Finnemore, supra note 16, at 325. 
32. Id.  
33. See generally Colin Hay, Constructivist Institutionalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS 56, 64-65 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006) (discussing constructive institutionalism); 
John L. Campbell & Ove Pedersen, Introduction, in THE RISE OF NEO-LIBERALISM AND 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 9–13 (John L. Campbell & Ove Pedersen eds., 2001) (discussing 
discursive institutionalism).  
34. Vivien A. Schmidt, Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse, 11 
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 303, 304 (2008). 
35. See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2004) (criticizing a 
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Within the WTO community, members convey their thoughts and 
arguments (ideas) through an iterative and ritualized process (discourse)36 
and eventually institutionalize those ideas as norms. More specifically, 
WTO members understand and react to each other’s behaviors within the 
WTO through a process of normative discourse, i.e., by referencing WTO 
norms. As a language (a “symbolic mode of communication”37), WTO 
norms form a “duality of praxis”38 in that they are employed to transmit 
ideas while, at the same time, they replicate and naturalize themselves.39 
WTO norms provide WTO members with a “generative grammar” and 
“underlying principles of order and meaning” that buttress the WTO’s 
operation.40
The new paradigm stands in stark contrast to the rationalist paradigm, 
which regards institutions as a matter of “choices,” such as “incorporation 
of international standards, judicial balancing, delegation to markets, 
national deference, and process-based review.”
 Thus, WTO norms play a critical role in socially constructing 
the WTO via discourse. 
41
The WTO discourse develops in certain distinctive spheres, such as 
during peer review in committees and during the adjudicatory process that 
takes place within the WTO dispute resolution mechanism, in which 
different social actors communicate via shared WTO norms.
 Under a communitarian, 
sociological framework, however, patterns of normative discourse within 
the WTO are influenced by history and are shaped as a result of different 
discursive conditions. As such, rather than a product of preset choices, the 
WTO community emerges and evolves over time in a less rigid manner. It 
is not a set of preprogrammed institutional choices informed by fixed 
preferences that define the WTO as it exists today; instead, the WTO is an 
evolving entity based on sedimented discourses, such as various 
institutional rules and practices (acquis communautaire). 
42
                                                                                                                                      
contractarian (Gesellschaftian) view on the WTO and offering a sociological (communitarian) 
framework instead). 
 These 
discursive spheres cultivate different kinds of socially meaningful patterns 
36. Schmidt, supra note 34, at 305; For a discussion regarding how iteration can influence 
international policy, see John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 193 
(1999). 
37. Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an 
Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19, 60 n.176 (2000). 
38. ROY BHASKAR, THE POSSIBILITY OF NATURALISM 38, 43–44 (3d ed. 1998). 
39. David Dessler, What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?, 43 INT’L ORG. 441, 467 (1989) 
(observing that “[r]ules are . . . media through which action becomes possible and which action itself 
reproduces and transforms”). 
40. John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 380 (1982). 
41. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 152. 
42. Susan Park, Norm Diffusion within International Organizations: A Case Study of the World Bank, 8 J. 
INT’L R. & DEV. 111, 113 (2005). 
328 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 52:321 
of practice, which subsequently generate socially acceptable norms in 
various forms, such as committee decisions, recommendations, or panel 
reports. Moreover, these institutionalized forms of WTO discourse, i.e., 
committee deliberation and adjudication, help to develop numerous 
derivative (secondary) discourses as a result of everyday interactions and 
communications among individual economic players, such as 
manufacturers, importers, and retailers, as well as other types of 
interlocutors, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), media 
outlets, and members of academia. 
The recent transformation of the international trade environment 
warrants the adoption of a communitarian paradigm in order to 
understand the WTO. The contemporary trade patterns shaped by new 
phenomena, such as global supply chains43 and cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, tend to increasingly defy the reciprocal and mercantilist logic 
on which conventional trade negotiations used to be based. This shifting 
Zeitgeist in international trade is in fact deeply associated with broader 
trends, such as “postnational constellation,”44
A cognitive-communicative reconstruction of the WTO may give rise to 
a view of the law that contains “egalitarian content.”
 in which states no longer 
monopolize international economic relations and various individual 
economic players, such as importers and distributors, also take the center 
stage. Thus, the existing understanding of international organizations 
demands a new dimension that recognizes more of the cognitive and 
communicative aspects of international institutions.  
45 As Shaffer and 
Trachtman admit, a rationalist perspective of the WTO leaves 
developmental concerns, such as the chronic lack of resources in 
developing countries, largely unaddressed.46 Once we characterize the 
WTO as a community, any developmental disparity tends to become 
increasingly “intolerable”47
                                                          
43. See Daniel Ikenson, Made on Earth: How Global Economic Integration Renders Trade Policy Obsolete, 
TRADE POL’Y ANALYSIS, No. 42, (Cato Inst. Ctr. for Trade Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 
2, 2009, at 1 passim (underscoring the recent global sourcing and production trends that tend to make 
conventional trade policies outdated). Regarding a theoretical analysis on global supply chains, see 
notably RONALD W. JONES, GLOBALIZATION AND THE THEORY OF INPUT TRADE (2000) 
(discussing the fragmentation of global production processes). 
 because such disparity generates 
communitarian risks that threaten the smooth operation of the WTO. In 
order to resolve this issue, the new communitarian paradigm can help 
WTO members adjust their way of thinking and generate new ideas and 
proposals to address these chronic problems.  
44. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 172 (Ciaran Cronin trans., Polity Press 2006). 
45. Id. at 131. 
46. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 127. 
47. Amartya Sen, Global Doubts, HARV. MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 68. 
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Against this background, this Article critiques the rationalist framework 
underlying Shaffer and Trachtman’s institutional analysis of the WTO and, 
at the same time, offers an alternative — sociological and 
communitarian — framework.48 The Article unfolds in the following 
sequence. Part I recounts Shaffer and Trachtman’s rationalist approach, 
which is based on concepts such as contract, choice, and institutions. It 
notes that the authors view the WTO as a set of institutional and 
interpretive choices that are designed to maximize both economic and 
political welfare (efficiency). Part II presents an alternative approach based 
on such notions as norms, discourse, and community. First, it highlights 
certain theoretical blind spots of rationalism due to its paradigmatic 
assumptions. This Part then offers a sociological approach to the WTO in 
an attempt to address those blind spots. It illustrates the rich social 
dynamics within the WTO community characterized by cognitive 
elements, such as norms, ideas and discourse. Concomitantly, it 
reinterprets rational choice narratives that the authors originally provided. 
The Article concludes that the new paradigm may disabuse the WTO 
constituencies of a fatalistic yet erroneous conviction that “legal provisions 
can be nothing other than reflections of unstable and shifting interest 
constellations among powers,”49 and help reinstate the “inspirational 
notions of virtue and of humans as social beings.”50
Finally, a word of caution is in order. This Article does not argue that 
the new sociological paradigm should supplant the rationalist approach 
that Shaffer and Trachtman employ. Nor does it suggest that the blind 
spots of the rationalist framework render it obsolete.
  
51
                                                          
48. Sociological approaches to understanding the WTO are rare. Regarding a notable exception, 
see Moshe Hirsch, 
 No paradigm is 
perfect. What the Article does attempt to achieve is to contribute to a 
more complete understanding of the WTO by providing an alternative 
paradigm and narrative. It also identifies a zone of convergence where the 
two paradigms may harmonize. In this regard, the general critique in this 
Article can also apply to other rationalist literatures to the extent that they 
The Sociology of International Economic Law: Sociological Analysis of the Regulation of 
Regional Agreements in the World Trading System, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 277 (2008) (applying a “symbolic-
interactionist” approach to the relationship between the WTO and regional trading agreements). In 
general, traditional international relations (IR) scholars have only recently begun to break from their 
tendency of disciplinary isolation and recognize social aspects of political life (including the role of 
norms and culture), which IR-dominated theories, such as realism and liberalism, do not consider. 
See, e.g., Finnemore, supra note 16, at 325. 
49. HABERMAS, supra note 44, at 167. 
50. David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 
97, 103 (2000). 
51. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreement: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 
VA. J. INT’L L. 113 (2003).  
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view international relations as a collection of contractual arrangements, as 
opposed to a community comprised of social interactions.52
I. THE ORIGINAL (RATIONAL) FRAMEWORK: INSTITUTIONS, 
CHOICES & CONTRACT 
 
In their paper Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO, Gregory 
Shaffer and Joel Trachtman aim to “develop a new framework for 
understanding the drafting and interpretation” of the WTO by exploring 
and analyzing various institutional choices made by WTO members and 
the WTO tribunal (panels or the Appellate Body).53 The authors focus on 
two dimensions of institutional choices: temporal and spatial.54
It is quite obvious that Shaffer and Trachtman’s overall analysis is based 
on the “law and economics” approach, or more broadly, “rationalism.” In 
particular, they draw on the comparative institutional analysis approach, 
which focuses on the role of the availability of alternatives in 
understanding a particular institution.
 The 
temporal dimension involves institutional choice-making at two different 
stages: a “treaty drafting” (ex ante) stage and a “treaty interpretation” (ex 
post) stage. Different patterns — and concerns — of institutional choices 
arise within each stage. The spatial dimension, meanwhile, refers to a range 
of “social decision-making processes” transpiring in different institutional 
loci, such as domestic, regional, international, political, administrative, 
judicial, and market fields. 
55 The authors also rely heavily on 
the “public choice theory,” which assumes that public officials, such as 
judges or WTO panelists, attempt to maximize their self-interests, 
including by aggrandizing their political welfare through empire-building.56 
To the extent that these officials are rational actors, “they will always move 
in a direction that can be determined by external observation.”57 Based on 
these theoretical grounds, Shaffer and Trachtman view the WTO as a 
welfare-maximizing “contract”58
                                                          
52. Regarding another piece of literature that is representative of the rationalist framework, see 
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 121 
(2008) (“Our basic rational choice assumptions imply that states will only enter into agreements when 
doing so makes them (or at least, their policy-makers) better off.”). Guzman argues that states 
comply with international law to maximize their interests, which are influenced by principles of 
reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation. Id. at 33–48, 71. 
 in which institutional choices are reduced 
53. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 105. 
54. Id. at 105–06. 
55. See id. 
56. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 490, 490–91 (1996); 
Rubin, supra note 17, at 310–11; Spence & Cross, supra note 50, at 102. 
57. Rubin, supra note 17, at 311. 
58. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 111. 
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to and defined by individual preferences and concerns of economic 
welfare.59
The theoretical foundations of the authors’ analyses cause Shaffer and 
Trachtman to interpret various aspects of the WTO’s structural design and 
operation in a purely rationalist framework. For example, Shaffer and 
Trachtman rely on the efficiency concern (the “cost of specification”) 
central to the rationalist paradigm to suggest that there is an institutional 
choice between rules and standards in the treaty-drafting stage.
 Thus, all institutional choices revolve around the ultimate 
rationalist goals of welfare maximizing and transaction-cost minimizing. 
60 They 
assume that broader standards may be more efficient than specific rules 
given the specification cost inherent in drawing narrow rules.61
Similarly, the authors regard the Appellate Body’s celebrated 
interpretation in Shrimp-Turtle
 
62 of the chapeau (the preambular language) 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX as 
a rational interpretive choice. In Shrimp-Turtle, the United States banned 
the importation of shrimp harvested by certain developing countries, such 
as India, Malaysia, and Indonesia, on the ground that these countries’ 
harvesting practices also incidentally killed endangered sea turtles.63 The 
United States claimed this trade restriction was justified because it was 
designed to protect the environment and thus was an allowed restriction 
under the general exception clause of GATT (Article XX(g)).64 
Nonetheless, the Appellate Body found that the U.S. ban failed to comply 
with the introductory language of Article XX (the chapeau), which 
stipulated that allowed justifications for failure to comply with GATT 
should not be abused (i.e., that restrictions should not amount to being 
“arbitrary” or “unjustifiable”).65
According to Shaffer and Trachtman, the Appellate Body’s prescription, 
i.e., multilateral negotiations, represents an example where members of the 
 The Appellate Body concluded that the 
United States’ failure to engage in multilateral negotiations with the 
targeted parties, which were available to the United States under 
preexisting environmental treaties, such as the Inter-American Convention 
for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, violated the chapeau. 
                                                          
59. Id. at 111, 116–17. 
60. Id. at 112. 
61. Id. 
62. Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, Appellate Body and Panel Report, as amended, (adopted on Nov. 6, 1998) 
[hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle]. 
63. Id.  
64. Id. at 55–56; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 187, art. XX(g) (“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption”). 
65. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 62, at 75; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 64, art. 
XX, pmbl. 
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WTO made a rationalist interpretive choice by delegating its authority to 
strike a balance between free trade and environmental protection to a 
subset of WTO members (disputants).66 The authors argue that one can 
understand this choice only by recognizing “the competing priorities held 
by the affected parties, because this type of decision involves 
commensuration between diverse values.”67 Therefore, their view is that 
affected parties in a given dispute can weigh and balance, in an optimal 
manner, the free trade value and the environmental protection value 
among themselves. Furthermore, arguing from the political efficiency 
(public choice) perspective,68 Shaffer and Trachtman observe that the 
Appellate Body’s decision was warranted, as long as it will not generate 
negative externalities.69
Not only do the authors rely on the rationalist paradigm to explain 
institutional choices made by the WTO as a general body, but they also 
employ the public choice theory in conjunction with the rationalist 
framework to compare institutional choices against the choices facing 
individual WTO members. As discussed above,
 That is, the Appellate Body’s decision is politically 
expedient and thus desirable, because the issue only concerns a limited 
number of affected parties, as long as these members’ multilateral 
negotiation does not somehow undermine the economic welfare of 
unaffected WTO members.  
70 public choice theorists 
argue that public officials behave in a rational manner in order to 
maximize their own self-interests; the public choice theory assumes that 
public officials will only act in ways that will enable them to maintain or 
increase their political power. Thus, Shaffer and Trachtman note that 
choices made within the WTO can be justified in two different ways: in 
pursuit of empire-building (“public choice welfare”) and in pursuit of trade 
liberalization (“public interest welfare”).71
Given the preceding discussion of their thesis, it is clear that Shaffer 
and Trachtman are concerned primarily with the concepts of efficiency, 
institutional choice, and public welfare. Although the authors’ rationalist 
framework considers a particular hypothetical institutional arrangement as 
a particular “social decision-making process” or “participation,”
  
72
                                                          
66. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 
 it largely 
brackets the social dynamics themselves. Thus, despite their claim that 
8, at 125–26. 
67. Id. at 126. 
68. Shaffer and Trachtman argue that political efficiency, which materializes in the form of an 
expedited political decision-making process, is the result of the involvement of a limited number of 
parties (governments) who are concerned with specific disputes that have only sub-multilateral 
impact. Id. 
69. Id. at 126. 
70. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
71. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 108 n.8. 
72. Id. at 106. 
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they would adopt a “law and society” perspective, the social, or 
sociological, aspects of the institutional process (decision-making) are not 
fully considered. Instead, an institutional choice amounts to no more than 
the selection of an option in a payoff matrix under a cost-benefit analysis 
driven by welfare and efficiency concerns.73
Take the example of the term “participation.” In Shaffer and 
Trachtman’s article, it is not used as a sociological concept, but rather as a 
rationalist concept. Shaffer and Trachtman argue that the idea of member 
participation involves the allocation of authority through the 
“incorporation of international standards, judicial balancing, delegation to 
markets, national deference, and process-based review,”
  
74 through various 
hypothetical (alternative) institutional arrangements.75 WTO member 
participation is a proxy for understanding how members seek to maximize 
the WTO’s welfare,76 because individual preferences can be inferred from 
behaviors such as participation.77 Participation is a “method of gauging 
welfare through revealed preferences.”78 Thus, the authors suggest that 
“participation lies at the heart of key economic concepts such as 
transaction costs, externalities, and resource allocation efficiency.”79 As a 
result, participation-based criteria can translate eventually into welfarist 
terms, rather than into any sociological phenomenon.80
The authors’ institutional scrutiny delivers a powerful heuristic on the 
WTO and its affairs. However, rationalism does not address “accounts 
based on post hoc observation of values or ideology.”
  
81 Of course, 
“[l]imiting the number of variables that a theory considers can increase 
both its explanatory content and its capacity to concentrate the scholarly 
mind.”82 This explains why the rationalist framework is capable of 
generating such a good deal of significant research, such as that of Shaffer 
and Trachtman.83
                                                          
73. Id.  
 By restricting the assumptions of the paradigm upon 
which it relies, the authors’ analysis, steered by institutional and 
interpretive choices, not only delivers convincing narratives on the WTO’s 
74. Id. at 152. 
75. Id. at 106–07. 
76. Id. at 106. 
77. Id. at 108. 
78. Id.  
79. Id. at 107 n.5 (quoting Neil Komesar, The Essence of Economics: Law, Participation and Institutional 
Choice (Two Ways), in ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT 165, 
170 (Sandra Batie & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2008)). 
80. Id. at 106–08. 
81. Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379, 392 
(1988). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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present operation, but also retains a predictive force on its future 
development. 
II. AN ALTERNATIVE (SOCIOLOGICAL) FRAMEWORK: NORMS, 
DISCOURSE, & COMMUNITY 
A. Rationalism’s Blind Spots 
No paradigm is perfect; it cannot explain or address everything. 
Rationalism is not an exception to this principle. Most importantly, it 
overlooks (“brackets”) the possibilities of the formation of and change in 
preferences, because it assumes that actors are rational and thus seek to 
maximize only fixed, preprogrammed profits or self-interests.84 Thus, it is 
beyond rationalism’s theoretical reach to consider that WTO institutions 
can conversely construct what WTO members think of themselves and 
their perceived interests, through “frame[s] of reference”85 and “normative 
orientations.”86 This is an unfortunate omission because it disenables us 
from discovering the social, in particular “discursive,” dimensions of the 
WTO.87
The first blind spot is that Shaffer and Trachtman’s rationalist 
methodology is largely silent on the concept of institutional change or 
evolution. In their Article, the authors discuss a form of ex ante 
institutional programming (specifically, the process of treaty creation) that 
is susceptible to a rationalist-positivist model. During this stage, sovereign 
states may determine in advance what they desire, based on rationalist 
calculations, by inserting favorable clauses within a treaty. Various ex post 
institutional arrangements are later constructed as a result of the 
interpretation of this treaty. Although Shaffer and Trachtman would argue 
that all of these ex post institutional arrangements and adjustments are 
rationally predetermined designs, the reality is that they may be more of a 
reflection of change that emerges over time within the WTO. 
Unfortunately, a rationalist paradigm cannot take these changes into 
account, due to its assumption that an institution is defined only by 
predetermined preferences based on welfare-maximizing considerations; 
an institutional change is either “assumed away”
 As a result, under the rationalist paradigm, we cannot adequately 
explain how WTO members build self-understandings (identities) that are 
distilled from their own social practices (acquis communautaire). This 
paradigmatic deficiency translates into several blind spots. 
88
                                                          
84. Thelen & Steinmo, supra note 
 or viewed as a 
21, at 8, 16.  
85. Koelble, supra note 23, at 232. 
86. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 23. 
87. Wendt, supra note 25, at 359. 
88. Katznelson & Weingast, supra note 26, at 7. 
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reprogramming of an institution due to unexpected external shocks.89
Second, despite its evident methodological merits, discussed above,
 In 
sum, the rationalist framework envisions very little room for institutional 
change. 
90 
rationalism’s conscious limitation on the scope of the study of an 
institution has its own weakness. Its analysis requires too many additional 
hidden assumptions because it brackets too many operational variables. 
Therefore, rationalism unavoidably leaves lingering “uncertainty” behind 
its analysis. For example, even if the Appellate Body’s judicial balancing of 
certain WTO standards may be justified in rationalist terms, i.e., in 
accordance with the “cost of specification,” it is less clear that the 
Appellate Body’s balancing would necessarily lead to an efficient 
outcome.91
The limitation on variables is also a problem because it means that a 
rationalist hypothesis must rely primarily on special cases. For example, 
under a rationalist paradigm, the use of non-WTO norms (such as 
international regulatory standards) in a WTO dispute may generate 
welfare — both economic and political — efficiency, but only if certain 
conditions are met. These conditions include: that non-WTO norms can 
properly deliver necessary information; that they are not abused for 
protectionist purposes; and that the use of such expertise (or expert 
organizations) does not favor any particular members over others.
  
92
Third, the authors’ rationalist approach to WTO dispute resolution 
tends to place too high of a value on textualism and thus undermines 
jurisprudential evolution within the WTO.
 In 
sum, in order to maintain its validity, a rationalist proposition necessitates 
a number of preconditions to be met; these preconditions, however, tend 
to be found predominately in special, not general, cases.  
93
                                                          
89. Helfer, supra note 
 The rationalist concern about 
the inefficient or excessive delegation to the judiciary is necessarily 
accompanied by an obsession with interpreting texts in their ordinary 
meaning in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. The reliance on textualism within the WTO is justified from a 
rationalist perspective as a deliberate institutional arrangement between 
27, at 662. 
90. See supra Part I. 
91. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 112. 
92. Id. at 134–35, 140. 
93. See, e.g., Henrik Horn and Joseph H.H. Weiler, European Communities — Trade Description of 
Sardines: Textualism and its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2002, at 248, 262 (Henrik Horn and 
Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2005). See also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World 
Trade Court”: Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J. 
WORLD TRADE 605, 617 (2002) (arguing that the Appellate Body relies on strict textual 
interpretation in its adjudications so as to avoid criticism that it has modified WTO members’ rights 
and obligations in the WTO treaty). 
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contracting parties (states) to maximize their joint welfare. It might be seen 
as “empowering the choices of WTO members and constraining the 
discretion of judges” or “giv[ing] primacy to the political branches that 
formulated the treaty, rather than to the judicial process.”94 Thus, the texts 
to be applied by the WTO are thrust upon the institution from the outside 
as an outcome of a deliberate, and thus rational, institutional choice. 
However, this textualism or theory of judicial restraint, reflecting the fear 
of “judicial usurpation,”95 cannot adequately explain the growth of law 
within the WTO.96
The fourth blind spot that Shaffer and Trachtman’s rationalist premise 
creates is that the paradigm leaves “normative” considerations, such as 
issues of participation, transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, largely 
unaddressed. For example, WTO members may make an explicit rational 
institutional choice to defer to a WTO tribunal to construct standards to 
be applied in future disputes, rather than nailing down precise texts in 
advance as rules. According to the rationalist framework, this delegation of 
discretion to future WTO authority is a rational choice to the extent that it 
is “justifiable in welfare terms.”
 Rationalist determinism, characterized by 
preprogrammed institutional choices, is largely oblivious to the possibility 
that WTO norms endogenously emerge through a social dynamics 
(discourse) in the WTO.  
97 At the same time, however, the authors 
concede that such an ostensibly rational choice is subject to certain 
criticism from a “participatory” perspective, because it creates problems of 
judicial activism.98 While Shaffer and Trachtman simply acknowledge that 
normative considerations (i.e., participation, transparency, accountability, 
and legitimacy) “will often be valued in themselves” in addition to 
contributing to rationalist goals (such as “articulating and furthering other 
individual preferences”), they do not articulate what those values are.99
The reason that many of these participatory and procedural values 
cannot be fully accounted for in rationalist terms is because they are of a 
cognitive-endogenous nature.
 
100
                                                          
94. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 
 In other words, these values emerge from 
internal social dynamics generated by reflective interactions, such as 
8, at 116–17. Similarly, Kal Raustiala observes that the WTO 
risks generating “quasi-constitutional” rules (“generativity”) as a result of secretive WTO tribunal 
proceedings. Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 415 (2000). 
95. Ezra R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Development of the Common Law, 5 
HARV. L. REV. 172, 172 (1892). 
96. Id. (observing that the growth of law via judicial legislation is not only “desirable” but also 
“necessary”). 
97. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 112. 
98. Id.  
99. Id. at 109. 
100. Cf. Finnemore, supra note 16, at 329 (“Organizations exist, proliferate, and have the form 
they do not because they are efficient but because they are externally legitimated.”). 
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discourse amongst WTO members. There exists an inevitable tension 
between the narrowly-bounded version of the rationalist paradigm, which 
is premised upon the “logic of interest,” and a broader framework that is 
based also on a “logic of appropriateness.”101 While the former paradigm 
concerns material-exogenous parameters, such as interest, power, and 
utilities, the latter concerns cognitive-endogenous ones, such as culture, 
values, and norms. While the former paradigm views an institution as a 
constraining structure, the latter views it as a “construct” of ideas.102 
Interestingly, as discussed above,103 Shaffer and Trachtman’s 
conceptualization of the rationalist framework may be broad enough to 
recognize both material-exogenous and cognitive-endogenous concerns; 
their argument does theoretically allow for the concepts of “political 
welfare” and “political efficiency” to be interpreted in light of participatory 
concerns.104
Fifth, Shaffer and Trachtman’s rationalist paradigm fails to address the 
fact that certain regulatory traditions that implicate human culture or 
values defy a rationalist approach in the area of risk regulation. That is, a 
rationalist approach to certain issues will not be able to account for the 
idea that different societies might be sensitive to different kinds of risks. 
Shaffer and Trachtman acknowledge that the rationalist institutional 
choice to delegate certain fact-finding authority to experts in WTO 
litigation may cause accountability concerns because the reliance on private 
individuals in veiled investigations may seem undemocratic.
 However, the extension of the logical assumptions of the 
rationalist paradigm to cognitive-endogenous ones would require too great 
a stretch in its parameters and would expose the paradigm to self-
contradiction. Thus, despite their claims of taking account of normative 
considerations, Shaffer and Trachtman present a paradigm that cannot 
credibly do so. 
105 These 
concerns also manifest in the well-documented debate over the definition 
of “risk” between rationalists and culturalists.106
                                                          
101. The “logic of interest” refers to the rationalist notion of evaluating behavior according to 
economic and other utilitarian benefits; the “logic of appropriateness,” meanwhile, denotes a 
sociological approach of judging behavior according to cultural propriety. JAMES G. MARCH & 
JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 
22–25 (1989). 
 Rationalists, such as Cass 
102. Schmidt, supra note 34, at 303 (“[N]orms are dynamic, intersubjective constructs rather than 
static structures.”).  
103. See supra text accompanying notes 54–58.  
104. For example, the authors recognize that an explicit cost-benefit analysis adopted by the 
Appellate Body, even if it may improve economic efficiency, would still be undesirable from the 
political welfare perspective, considering the incommensurability among different “values and 
concerns.” Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 144 (citing Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and . . . Problems, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 32 (1998)). 
105. Id. at 137. 
106. Id. 
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Sunstein, tend to construct the concept of risk rather strictly, i.e., as 
something objective and calculable. Thus, they view any aversions to risk 
as stemming from certain psychological errors (“heuristic biases”) or 
unwarranted fears of political pandering (“populism”).107 In contrast, 
culturalists, such as Dan Kahan and James Boyle, believe that such 
“technocratic rationality” undermines legitimate debates in national 
democracies in that a narrowly-defined value (technology) may usurp 
diverse yet rich voices.108
The Appellate Body in the Hormones case adopts the culturalist view of 
risk. This case involved a European import ban on U.S. beef treated with 
growth-promotion hormones, which the United States argued was 
scientifically justified. Specifically, the Appellate Body ruled that: 
 These diverging concepts of risk play a vital role 
in allocating regulatory power between the WTO and regulating states. 
[T]he risk that is to be evaluated in a risk assessment under Article 
5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory operating 
under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies 
as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for 
adverse effects on human health in the real world where people live and 
work and die.109
Thus, in Hormones, the Appellate Body rejected the application of a 
rational approach by refusing to evaluate two situations that could have 
been scientifically compared to each other, i.e., naturally occurring 
hormones in food and artificially injected hormones found in food.
 
110 In 
fact, the Appellate Body viewed these two situations as incommensurable, 
claiming that there was some “fundamental distinction,” and held that any 
attempt to compare them would be absurd.111
                                                          
107. MARK A. POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 103 (2009); CASS 
SUNSTEIN, THE LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 25, 126 (2005). 
 
108. POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 107, at 103; James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal 
Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 751 (1985); Dan Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: 
A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2006). 
109. Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶187, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Hormones]. Regarding this case, see David A. Wirth, European 
Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), International Decisions, 92 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 755, 755 (1998); see also Ilona Cheyne, Risk and Precaution in World Trade Organization Law, 40 
J. WORLD TRADE 837, 842 (2006) (highlighting the limited value of risk assessment because of its 
accompanying inherent tendency to interpret complex data and competing opinions in a subjective 
manner). 
110. Hormones, supra note 109, ¶ 246.  
111. Id. ¶ 221. However, scientists have observed that taking different pathways in consuming 
hormones, i.e., whether eating meat that had hormones that were naturally present or were artificially 
injected, does not significantly lead to disparate health impacts, as long as the residual level of these 
hormones in the human body remained within the limit set by international standards, such as the 
Codex standards. Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
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Unfortunately, despite the fact that the Appellate Body recognized 
cultural and sociological concerns, it has also suggested implementing a 
form of utilitarian judicial balancing, which could be highly problematic in 
the face of diverse values.112
In sum, determination of whether a measure . . . may nevertheless 
be “necessary” within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves 
in every case, a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors 
which prominently include the contribution made by the 
compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at 
issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected 
by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law 
or regulation on imports or exports.
 The Korean Beef case concerned a Korean 
regulation (a “dual retail” system) that required a separate retail outlet for 
imported beef from that exclusively reserved for indigenous Korean beef 
(Hanwoo). Striking down the regulation as unnecessary to prevent 
fraudulent practices, the Appellate Body held that:  
113
A rationalist scholar would argue that this weighing and balancing test 
forces the regulating country to pick the most rational option among a set 
of policy alternatives available to the country. In fact, although the 
Appellate Body in Korean Beef did not conduct an explicit cost-benefit 
evaluation,
 
114 it still second-guessed the domestic government’s regulatory 
determinations on critical issues, such as the appropriate level of trade 
protection, and thus prioritized one policy goal (i.e., the free movement of 
beef) over others (e.g., consumer protection). Specifically, the Appellate 
Body concluded that allowing regular policing over the fraudulent labeling 
of imported beef as Korean beef would be less trade restrictive, and thus 
more rational, than forcing beef retailers to split their retail outlets into one 
for foreign beef and the other solely for Korean beef, even though that 
would have better protected consumer interests and values.115
Although the Appellate Body’s holding in Korean Beef may seem to fit 
well under a purely rationalist paradigm, the test in Korean Beef in fact 
promotes the weighing and balancing of conflicting values, i.e., the free 
trade value (the “accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports 
  
                                                                                                                                      
(Hormones), ¶ 8.187, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997). 
112. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 141–42. 
113. Appellate Body Report, Korea — Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
¶ 164, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) (adopted Jan. 10, 2001) (emphasis 
added) [hereinafter Korean Beef]. 
114. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 142; see also Donald H. Regan, The Meaning of Necessary 
in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 
347 (2007) (arguing that the WTO Appellate Body has not actually engaged in any genuine 
“balancing” despite its eponymous undertaking). 
115. Korean Beef, supra note 113, at ¶ 181. 
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or exports”) and the regulatory value (the “importance of the common 
interests or values protected by that law or regulation”).116 However, as 
discussed above, the Appellate Body’s earlier position in Hormones rejected 
the use of a weighing and balancing test; the Appellate Body found that 
there was no useful judicial balancing test to apply because the two 
regulatory situations in question were incomparable.117
The final blind spot of the rationalist framework, as the authors admit, 
is that it cannot respond to the fact that an international political process is 
still vulnerable to various biases due to the asymmetrical distribution of 
power and resources among WTO members.
 In sum, it is hard to 
aver that the Appellate Body has adopted the rationalist approach (of 
weighing and balancing) in its judicial review on risk regulation because 
there are also elements of culturalism within its decisions. If the Appellate 
Body has actually embraced the rationalist paradigm and its accompanying 
weighing and balancing test, the Appellate Body will invite a great deal of 
criticism from domestic regulators, because such judicial balancing 
sacrifices regulatory values in favor of efficiency (i.e., free trade).  
118 Both in a negotiation and 
a litigation setting, powerful and resourceful bureaucrats and interest 
groups from developed countries tend to prevail over developing 
countries.119 Powerful countries are thus able to externalize their domestic 
interests and preferences in the international trade setting. As long as these 
domestic, often mercantilist, interests shape states’ actions, the WTO qua 
organization might not be able to fulfill its original goals, such as “an 
integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system.”120 For 
example, the Doha Development Round is still in disarray after a decade 
of negotiations, mainly because its original development dimension has 
not materialized amid major trading nations’ obsession with a 
reciprocal — “balanced,” to use a euphemistic term — deal.121
Granted, Shaffer and Trachtman occasionally admit these rationalist 
limitations. Anchored by their reliance on rationalism, however, their 
 
Unfortunately, the rationalist paradigm, with its assumption of 
predetermined institutional choices defined only by efficiency concerns, 
fails to recognize or suggest a solution for this problem in the WTO. 
                                                          
116. Id. 
117. See, e.g., Richard Warner, Does Incommensurability Matter? Incommensurability and Public Policy, 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 1287 (1998) (calling to attention occasions in which reasons behind policy choices are 
incommensurable). 
118. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 127. 
119. Id. at 144; see also Conti, supra note 30, at 626–27. 
120. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154. 
121. Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 573 
(2010) (criticizing the United States’s obsession with the titular “balanced” approach to the Doha 
Round negotiations). 
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sporadic acknowledgement of the paradigmatic dilemma does not invite a 
paradigm shift. Even when they attempt to introduce complementary 
methodologies, such as the law and society approach, what they mostly 
offer are mere glimpses into these frameworks and not a full-scale 
adoption of them. Moreover, even these cursory overviews are often 
captured by rationalist terms. For example, Shaffer and Trachtman 
recognize that WTO members, businesses, civil society, and even 
academics compose an “interpretive community.”122 This is rather 
surprising in that this term signifies a nonrationalist tradition; in fact, 
competing paradigms, such as constructivism, often employ it instead. 
Nonetheless, the authors understand this social dynamic (that of meaning-
giving) only as a structure of constraint, rather than as a social construct 
itself. As a result, although Shaffer and Trachtman’s framework recognizes 
that the existence of the interpretive community constrains the discretion 
of the WTO’s tribunal as a rational (political) actor,123 it fails to understand 
that the community to which the WTO tribunal itself belongs constructs 
the very interest and the identity of the WTO members by relying on 
shared social meanings and norms.124
Thus, although Shaffer and Trachtman raise the possibility of “social 
processes involving interpretive communities,”
 
125 they nonetheless fail to 
articulate what such social processes are made of. They do not articulate 
the social possibility that the communitarian solidarity within the WTO, 
enabled by “generative grammar” and “underlying principles of order and 
meaning,” shapes the contour of GATT/WTO’s institutional 
development.126 They do not view WTO norms as a discursive device 
being operated upon under the “shared understandings or behavioral 
expectations” of WTO members.127
                                                          
122. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 
 Likewise, they do not elaborate upon 
the microscopic social dynamics transpiring within the interpretive 
communities of the WTO, such as the process of “judicial internalization,” 
in which members of these communities as interlocutors or norm-
sponsors actively mobilize international law in domestic litigations in an 
attempt to incorporate the former into the latter (i.e., “transnational public 
8, at 119. 
123. Id. at 120–22. 
124. Sungjoon Cho, Reconstructing an International Organization: A Paradigm Shift in the World Trade 
Organization 20 (Apr. 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1823564). 
125. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 120. 
126. Ruggie, supra note 40, at 380. 
127. Brunnée & Toope, supra note 37, at 67; see also Finnemore, supra note 16; March & Olsen, 
supra note 13; Karol Soltan, A Social Science That Does Not Exist, in REDISCOVERING FULLER 393 
(William J. Witteveen & Wibren van der Burg eds., 1999). 
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law litigation”).128
 
 In sum, the authors’ paradigmatic (rationalist) schema 
largely brackets social aspects of the WTO operation.  
B. New Framework: The Sociology of the WTO 
The aforementioned paradigmatic limitations endemic to the rationalist 
approach call for a new framework. Although a new paradigm of the 
WTO would not entirely supplant the rationalist understanding of the 
WTO, it could still remedy some of its theoretical blind spots. In this 
regard, this Article proposes a sociological (constructivist) approach to 
understanding the WTO, under which we may reconstruct the WTO as a 
community (Gemeinschaft).129 Steve Brint conceptualizes a Gemeinschaft as a 
group of significant properties that is defined by social relations, rather 
than a tangible, material location, such as a town.130 This is easily translated 
to the context of the WTO, because the WTO’s community is based not 
on blood or ethnicity, but on certain social bonds or cognitively-shared 
grounds.131
The sociological interpretation of the WTO draws on socio-cognitive 
(intersubjective) parameters, such as “dense and demanding social ties” 
and “common beliefs in an idea system.”
 
132 The GATT/WTO’s enduring 
operational efficacy for the last six decades can be explained in sociological 
terms, in that its members have been able to interact, communicate, and 
eventually converge their expectations through a medium of norms, such 
as jurisprudence, that are informed by their shared goals, such as free trade 
and global market integration. It is WTO norms and social structures that 
determine how members perceive their interests and identities within the 
context of the WTO’s object and purpose.133
                                                          
128. Harold Koh raises the possibility of incorporation of international law into domestic law by 
implicitly interpreting the latter to be consistent with the former or by explicitly allowing and 
developing the idea of “transnational public law litigation.” Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations 
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2657 (1997).  
 Therefore, under a 
sociological approach, WTO membership is not reduced to a mere sum of 
129. See generally Cho, supra note 35. 
130. Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept, 19 
SOC. THEORY 1, 3–4 (2001) (reinterpreting Ferdinand Tönnies’ classical concept of gemeinschaft as a 
set of human relations against the contemporary background).  
131. But cf. Elisabeth Zoller, Institutional Aspects of International Governance, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 121, 123 (1995) (arguing that an international society is not an international community in that the 
former lacks the “commonness” located exclusively in national communities).  
132. Brint, supra note 130, at 3–4. 
133. Contra Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 50 WORLD 
POL. 324, 325–26 (1998) (identifying a new (constructivist) trend amongst international relations 
scholars of studying international organizations with an emphasis on certain cognitive factors, such as 
norms, cultures, and identities). 
2012] BEYOND RATIONALITY 343 
material rights and obligations; rather, it entitles members to certain 
assurances and a sociological sense of belonging. 
WTO members understand and reflect on each other’s behaviors 
through a shared normative discourse, i.e., by referencing WTO norms. 
Offering the “logic of appropriateness”134 as well as “semantic 
regularities”135 to members, WTO norms generate certain “patterns of 
practice” as well as “shared understandings or behavioral expectations.”136 
As a result, members are able to build a collective identity (“we” or 
community) among themselves.137 Within the WTO community, members 
“work[ ] . . . together creatively to refashion the linguistically structured 
symbols of social cohesion which serve as the resources for intersubjective 
experience, with the aim of motivating action.”138
The recent transformation of the international trade environment 
further warrants a communitarian paradigm shift in the WTO. Since the 
GATT’s inception, the global market has become increasingly integrated. 
Contemporary consumers and producers interact across borders. More 
consumers consume both goods and services abroad. Thanks to 
technological and telecommunication innovations, producers can now 
optimize their production chains across multiple countries through global 
supply chains.
  
139 Now, the main actors of international trade are not states, 
but various individual economic players, such as suppliers, manufacturers 
(from all different production stages), importers, distributors, wholesalers, 
retailers, shippers, bankers, forwarders, insurers, and consumers. In this 
“postnational constellation,”140 trade relations are no longer defined in 
statist, reciprocal, mercantilist, and thus confrontational terms that pit 
domestic producers against foreign producers.141
                                                          
134. March & Olsen, supra note 
 Instead, the center of 
attention shifts from sovereign states to those individual economic players 
who participate in and now drive the development of the international 
trading community. As a result, a pure rationalist framework that focuses 
101, at 23. 
135. PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 139 (1987). 
136. Brunnée & Toope, supra note 37, at 67; see also Finnemore, supra note 16, at 325–26; March 
& Olsen, supra note 101, at 184; Soltan, supra note 128, at 393. 
137. See Chios Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 527, 535 (2008) 
(characterizing the WTO as a “constitutional” instrument that “seeks to protect the distribution of 
expectations concerning the trade-related behavior of governments”).  
138. Francis J. Mootz III, Natural Law and the Cultivation of Legal Rhetoric, in REDISCOVERING 
FULLER, supra note 127, at 425, 442. 
139. See supra note 43. 
140. HABERMAS, supra note 44, at 172. 
141. “Developments in the production, exchange, and/or use of private goods and nonspecific 
assets will more and more be shaped and determined primarily by transnational or global factors and 
trends.” Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49 INT’L ORG. 595, 621 
(1995). 
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on the role of state actors in empire-building is becoming deficient in 
understanding the development of the contemporary WTO. 
Finally, a shift to the communitarian paradigm is necessary once it is 
recognized that the rationalist approach ignores the disparity in 
development amongst the members of the WTO community. If we 
characterize the WTO as a community, such developmental disparity tends 
to become increasingly intolerable,142 as it generates communitarian risks 
that threaten the smooth operation of the community. For example, when 
poverty begets violence, such as pirates, civil wars, and terrorism,143 the 
WTO’s community suffers because there is often a corresponding 
disruption of supply chains and subsequent loss of employment. The 
recent global financial crisis has only aggravated the existing 
developmental disparity. The world’s poor will suffer from the crisis long 
after more developed countries recover from it.144
III. APPLYING THE NEW FRAMEWORK TO THE WTO 
 Here, the new 
(communitarian) paradigm can help WTO members gradually change their 
way of thinking and generate new ideas and proposals to address these 
long-unattended concerns. In sum, a new (Gemeinschaftian) paradigm for 
the WTO can complement the old paradigm (rationalism), in that the 
former can illuminate some of blind spots left by the latter and thus offer 
the WTO a new pathway towards addressing some of its contemporary 
issues. 
A. Institutional Evolution From Within  
Under the rationalist framework, it is assumed that the WTO is an 
embodiment of institutional “choices,” which are the product of a cost-
benefit analysis between institutional “alternatives,” such as the 
“incorporation of international standards, judicial balancing, delegation to 
markets, national deference, and process-based review.”145
                                                          
142. Sen, supra note 
 In contrast, 
under the communitarian framework, the WTO is also a reflection of the 
intersection of various emerging patterns of normative discourse within 
the WTO that are influenced by historical developments and different 
47, at 68. 
143. See generally Sungjoon Cho, A New Agenda for Peace: International Trade Law as a Practical 
Discourse, in TRADE AS GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY?: CRITICAL, HISTORICAL 
AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 63 (Padideh Ala’i et al eds., 2006) (warning that trade 
marginalization and consequent international developmental difficulties (global poverty) tends to give 
rise to conflicts). 
144. Cho, supra note 121, at 35 (observing that the recent global financial crisis would wreak 
havoc on poor countries, even though it originated from rich countries). 
145. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 152. 
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discursive conditions.146
Because the WTO community develops over time, it should not be 
viewed as a set of preprogrammed institutional choices informed by fixed 
preferences, but as an evolving entity that stems from developing, 
institutional discourse, such as various institutional rules and practices 
(acquis communautaire). This recognition of a historical dimension of the 
WTO critically distinguishes the new paradigm from the rationalist 
approach. As discussed above,
 After all, why and how states formulate their 
choices depend on how they define their interests and identities.  
147
Not only would a sociological paradigm be useful for better 
understanding institutional change generally, but it can also be used to 
recognize the role of WTO committees in contributing to this evolution of 
the WTO. Relying on the rationalist paradigm, Shaffer and Trachtman 
consider WTO committees, such as the Antidumping Committee or the 
Committee on Regional Trading Agreements, as preprogrammed, political 
decision-making processes that aim to alleviate the adjudicative burdens of 
WTO tribunals by elaborating on the textual meanings of certain 
provisions.
 one of the blind spots left by rationalism 
is its lack of satisfactory explanation as to the real phenomenon of 
institutional change. The sociological (constructivist) paradigm can address 
such a deficiency, because it deals within cognitive parameters, such as 
cultures, values, and discourse, that necessarily analyze changes in a 
dynamic fashion. Thus, under the new paradigm, institutional change can 
be explained because the WTO is viewed as being constantly subjected to 
an evolutionary or adaptive process of continuous, incremental 
institutional development that is premised upon WTO members’ reflection 
of the past. 
148 Thus, WTO committees exist to reduce transaction costs 
borne by WTO members in resolving disputes; they are designed to apply, 
but not expand upon, preexisting institutional choices. Under the new 
paradigm, however, these committees can be viewed to offer an “iterative 
process” of “justificatory discourse.”149
                                                          
146. See supra text accompanying notes 135–42.  
 Through continuing discourse 
(peer reviews) in the committee discursive sphere, WTO members may 
expand their shared normative values by expressing them in various legal 
materials, such as guidelines or recommendations. In turn, these legal 
materials encourage future discourse in the area of international trade 
matters that they address, be it in antidumping, sanitary, or any other area 
of regulation.  
147. See supra text accompanying notes 89–90. 
148. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 123–24. 
149. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 25–27 (1995). 
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Through the perspective of the sociological paradigm, the WTO’s 
delegation of responsibility to other international organizations or 
international standard-setting bodies may also be understood to be 
motivated by reasons beyond mere economic welfare efficiency.150 Such 
delegation can be viewed instead as the WTO’s creation of cross-
institutional platforms that allow for “inter-discourse” between the WTO 
and non-WTO regimes. These discursive platforms are explicitly 
recognized in different international documents, such as in Articles 3.5 and 
12.3 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement). Article 3.5 requires the SPS Committee to “develop a 
procedure to monitor the process of international harmonization and 
coordinate efforts in this regard with the relevant international 
organizations.”151 Article 12.3 also mandates the SPS Committee to 
“maintain close contact with the relevant international organizations,” such 
as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, in order to “secur[e] the best 
available scientific and technical advice.”152
B. Adjudicative Discourse 
 Thus, not only is the WTO itself 
influenced by discursive developments, but it also communicates with other 
organizations to build a more extensive international dialogue based on 
shared norms and values. The sociological framework, unlike the rationalist 
one, recognizes these interplays and seeks to integrate them into the overall 
understanding of the WTO.  
The sociological paradigm is also able to bring additional explanatory 
insight as to the condition of the judicial institutions and legal functions of 
the WTO. According to Shaffer and Trachtman, rationalist paradigms 
regard the extensive delegation of interpretive power to WTO tribunals as 
a rational institutional choice, made during the initial stage of treaty 
drafting and characterized by a generally ineffective decision-making 
process dominated by consensus rule.153
                                                          
150. Cf. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 
 However, contrary to this 
rationalist viewpoint, the state of WTO tribunals is not static. There is an 
endogenous sociological dynamic amongst WTO members, wherein they 
engage in continuing discourse relating to the nature of WTO adjudication 
(adjudicative discourse). Not only as disputing parties, but also as 
interested parties, WTO members collectively contribute to the 
adjudicative discourse and influence the jurisgenerative, or jurisprudential, 
8, at 114. 
151. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 3.5, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
493 (1994). 
152. Id. art. 12.3. 
153. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 123–24. 
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process through different modes of argumentation, persuasion, and 
deliberation. Moreover, this adjudicative discourse does not take place only 
to passively deduce predetermined texts, as rationalists may claim. Instead, 
such discourse “seek[s to build] consistency that connects past, present, 
and future”154 conditions of the WTO, not by blindly sticking to its 
framers’ intentions, but by seeking the “exigencies of contemporary 
life.”155
In addition to its contribution in reframing the role of WTO tribunals, 
the new paradigm sheds fresh light on the WTO tribunals’ various 
interpretive choices. According to Shaffer and Trachtman and the 
rationalist paradigm, even judicial interpretation is a matter of institutional 
design (choice) in a welfare-maximizing contract. Therefore, the rationalist 
scholar is only concerned about what kinds of norms have actually been 
delegated to WTO tribunals to apply or impose in accordance with the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. For example, according to 
Shaffer and Trachtman, Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement is a 
conscious choice by WTO members to “constrain treaty interpretation of 
particular provisions by assigning particular interpretive rules to them.”
 
156 
Under Article 17.6(ii), a panel must defer its interpretive power to a 
domestic antidumping authority if the latter’s determination rests on one 
of possible interpretations that the former may permit. Article 17.6(ii) 
could arguably be seen as a method of constraint; for example, to the 
United States, this article was a “Trojan horse” within the Antidumping 
Agreement because it would safeguard U.S. sovereign authority in 
regulating allegedly dumped imports.157 However, the Appellate Body 
rejected what would have been a rationalist interpretation of Article 17.6(ii) 
by claiming that it held interpretive competence vis-à-vis WTO members. 
This claim of power by the Appellate Body can best be understood under 
the sociological framework; its decision largely drew on preceding 
communications and advocacy from parties who were interested in 
increasing the role of the WTO within the antidumping arena.158
Another difference between rationalism and the new sociological 
framework is how each paradigm perceives the WTO tribunals’ authority 
(discretion) in applying non-WTO laws, such as multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs), in accordance with Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. On its face, Article 31.3(c) mandates 
that WTO tribunals take into account any applicable, relevant non-WTO 
  
                                                          
154. THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 335 (1995).  
155. JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 96 (2005) 
(quoting Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the UN, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 17–18). 
156. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 117. 
157. Sungjoon Cho, Global Constitutional Lawmaking, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 621, 663–64 (2010). 
158. Id. at 644–49. 
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international law.159 Therefore, from a rationalist standpoint, a WTO panel 
must cite an MEA in a WTO dispute where both parties are also parties to 
that MEA because Article 31.3(c) reflects a preprogrammed choice that 
was designed to increase the efficiency or political welfare of the WTO.160 
Therefore, this mandatory nexus between WTO norms and non-WTO 
norms might be justified in welfarist terms. The utilization of non-WTO 
norms may increase “welfare efficiency” in the WTO operation because 
such utilization brings outside expertise to the WTO to solve its 
problems.161
The dilemma with interpreting the Article 31.3(c) mandate as only a 
product of rational, institutional choice, as opposed to also being subjected 
to normative discourse amongst the parties involved, is that it makes the 
rationalist paradigm vulnerable to two main problems. First, merely 
ratifying an MEA does not ensure the presence of adequate discourse or 
shared grounds between parties concerned. More often than not, 
developing countries ratify those agreements largely as a badge of honor, 
without any serious discussion or due administrative and financial capacity 
to implement them. Second, if one interprets Article 31.3(c) a contrario, 
should a WTO tribunal not use an MEA in a dispute between a party and 
a nonparty to the MEA? According to Shrimp-Turtle, an MEA may still be 
referenced to evaluate the WTO behavior of an MEA-member party.
 
162 
Such member’s normative behavior within the WTO context is thus 
regulated by the MEA and then socially configured and reconfigured vis-à-
vis another member who is not a party to the MEA.163
When the rationalist paradigm views the intersection between the WTO 
and non-WTO organizations as simply a decision on the part of the WTO 
to either apply (impose) non-WTO norms or not, it tends to overlook 
more subtle, nuanced discursive possibilities of “inter-discourse”
 This process tends 
to generate a new social dynamic made up of narratives, rhetoric, claims, 
and arguments involving WTO norms as they relate to an MEA. 
164
                                                          
159. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.3(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331(“There shall be taken into account, together with the context: . . . (c) any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”). 
 
between the WTO and non-WTO systems. This interdiscourse is not a 
matter of any external imposition of norms in an authoritative or 
160. See supra text accompanying note 145. 
161. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 134–35. 
162. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 62. 
163. The Appellate Body failed to fully capture the subtle discursive connection implicit under 
Article 31.3(c) of the VCLT when it took a binary, choice-based approach in Mexico-Soft Drinks, 
ruling that it might not “determine rights and duties outside the covered agreements.” Appellate Body 
Report, Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶ 56, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 
2006) (emphasis added).  
164. GOODRICH, supra note 135, at 146–51. 
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hierarchical sense; instead, it should be viewed more as a nuanced frame of 
reference in a cognitive sense. The strength of this discursive link between 
the two systems depends on the extent of the range of shared cognitive 
grounds between parties concerned, i.e., whether government officials 
recognize a particular non-WTO norm in their everyday regulation or 
administration of affairs and whether such norm is part of the practical 
legal discourse amongst affected practitioners.  
Importantly, certain legal technicalities, such as “judicial notice,”165 may 
shield those interlocutors’ exercise of cognitive (communicative) rationality 
from a potential positivist attack under the WTO treaty. The WTO 
community’s discursive sphere as defined in a strict jurisdictional term is 
confined to the titular “covered agreements” under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). Specifically, a WTO member has no right under the 
WTO treaty to sue another member for the latter’s violation of non-WTO 
treaties, such as the International Monetary Fund Agreement or the 
International Labor Organization Charter. Nor is a WTO panel 
empowered to apply non-WTO norms in adjudicating WTO disputes 
raised under covered agreements. Thus, the rationalist paradigm argues 
that these limitations may be understood as rational constraints created by 
sovereign WTO members who view non-WTO norms as irreconcilable 
with the WTO’s original contractual terms, whose primary function is to 
increase economic efficiency and trade liberalization.166
From a sociological standpoint, however, the aforementioned 
constraints on the application of non-WTO norms simply reflect the 
current discursive conditions in which the WTO’s community is situated 
as they relate to non-WTO norms. The current discourse merely signals 
that, as of right now, there is an institutional boundary to the shared 
grounds between the WTO and non-WTO legal systems. The so-called 
“fragmentation” of international law is more of a natural (discursive) status 
of international law than of a matter of institutional choice.  
 
Thus, the moment we understand WTO norms as a language or a 
communicative medium, we can liberate our discussion of WTO norms 
from rationalist assumptions and move forward in the future development 
of the WTO. To remain sustainable in the international political arena, the 
WTO community must continue to communicate with its environment 
and expand its discursive sphere (shared grounds) to non-WTO legal 
systems.167
                                                          
165. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 201. (“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable 
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 
be questioned.”). 
 Of course, this communication should begin with indirect, 
166. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 131–33. 
167. See generally Sungjoon Cho, Toward an Identity Theory of International Organizations, 102 AM. 
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osmotic processes (e.g., simply judicially noticing or taking into account 
non-WTO laws), rather than in direct, concrete terms (e.g., applying non-
WTO laws). Through these indirect processes, judicial notice, as an 
objective assessment of facts within the meaning of the DSU, can be more 
of a discursive platform, on the basis of which WTO tribunals may 
recognize and utilize non-WTO norms in a cognitive sense. In that way, 
WTO tribunals are able to take non-WTO norms into account, but do not 
need to be confronted with a rationalist (binary) choice as to whether to 
apply them in contravention to preexisting WTO constraints.  
A word of caution should be added here, however. Even though WTO 
tribunals do retain certain discretion to consult non-WTO norms, as 
implied in EC — Biotech,168 such discretion should not be reduced merely 
to individual judges’ preferences in a public choice model. According to 
the new sociological paradigm, the inclusion of non-WTO norms should 
be a discursive reflection of the culture, values, and norms of the 
interpretive community within the WTO.169
C.  Risk Regulation 
 This discourse endeavors to 
preserve a connection to its environment, including non-WTO legal 
systems, by expanding the discursive sphere. Thus, through different 
forms of discourse, including adjudication, various interlocutors (e.g., 
traders, trading nations, and the WTO tribunals) should expand their 
cognitive boundaries to include non-WTO laws in order to produce better 
arguments and decisions within the WTO system. 
Another normative dilemma that the rationalist approach cannot 
reconcile is the debate between rationalists and culturalists as to the role of 
risk regulation.170
                                                                                                                                      
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 157 (2008). Shaffer and Trachtman present a similar perspective in rationalist 
terms. According to the authors, the WTO tribunal may opt to “accommodate conflicting 
provisions” in non-WTO agreements, despite textual constraints, when it feels the need to protect 
the WTO regime from certain challenges to its legitimacy or to mitigate the tensions that a contrary 
decision would create as a result of the current fragmented state of the international law system. 
Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 
 For example, the recent dogmatic disputes between the 
8, at 29. 
168. Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, (Sep. 29, 2006). In this case, a WTO panel 
struck down the EU’s moratorium on the approval of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for 
procedural reasons (undue delay). Id. It also invalidated some members’ import bans on GMOs on 
the ground that such a ban prevents members from conducting risk assessments, which may have 
resulted in the allowance of certain GMOs, given the sufficiency of available, relevant scientific 
information. Id. The panel ruled that Article 31(3)(c) should be interpreted to “mandate consideration 
of other applicable rules of international law . . . which are applicable in the relations between all 
parties to the treaty which is being interpreted.” Id. ¶ 7.70 (emphasis added). 
169. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 8, at 29. (observing from a constructivist perspective that 
social context may inform judicial interpretation). 
170. Id. at 137. 
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United States and Europe over the safety of hormone-treated beef and 
genetically modified food raises questions as to the blind faith accorded to 
the mainstream version of science, upon which rational paradigms often 
rely to justify sanitary regulations.171 The sociological framework would 
instead turn to the study of philosophy, in particular that of hermeneutics, 
to suggest that there is room for reconciliation between the two parties 
through continuing dialogue and, subsequently, “a lessening of distance”172
To achieve this result, WTO members should fully utilize various 
procedural mechanisms that are made available for regulatory dialogue 
through major WTO agreements, such as the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).
 
between the two conflicting perspectives.  
173 For example, the SPS 
Committee provides a special peer review procedure called “specific trade 
concerns,” in which WTO members resolve controversial SPS issues 
through discussions and consultations with each other.174 Thus, members 
can endeavor to resolve conceptual disagreements by exploiting the 
multiple avenues that have been made available for such regulatory 
dialogue.175
D. Development 
 
The new sociological framework may also proffer prescriptive 
responses to some of the normative dilemmas that the rationalist approach 
is incapable of coping, due to its paradigmatic limitations. As discussed 
above, rationalism neither recognizes nor offers a solution to the 
developmental disparity amongst WTO members.176 Under the new 
sociological paradigm, such developmental disparity is treated as a serious 
problem to the development of discursive spheres. All participants to the 
development of the WTO discourse must be able to communicate 
competently, since the WTO’s “jurisgenerative communicative power” can 
only originate from “undamaged intersubjectivity found in nondistorted 
communication.”177
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Yet, many developing countries cannot effectively participate in the 
WTO discourse transpiring in various spheres, such as in adjudication and 
committee meetings, because they lack the financial and technical 
capabilities to do so. As a result, these discursive spheres are deprived of 
the “discourse ethics”178 or “ideal speech situation”179
E. Paradigmatic Reconciliation: A Zone of Convergence 
 that is a critical 
prerequisite for any genuine discourse. Because the sociological framework 
recognizes the danger of unbalanced representation in discursive spheres, 
it also calls for international development organizations, such as the World 
Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), NGOs, and individual developed countries to extend more 
financial and technical assistance to those developing countries, in order to 
foster more well-rounded, global communication. 
This Article contrasts the new sociological framework with the 
rationalist approach advanced by Shaffer and Trachtman in their analysis 
of the WTO based on institutional and interpretive choices. The Article 
presents the former as a methodological response to certain dilemmas that 
the latter inevitably ignores or cannot resolve. However, the fact that these 
two paradigms arise from different sets of assumptions does not 
necessarily disallow a zone of theoretical convergence between the two 
frameworks. Even a market-based model of institutional understanding 
may be amenable to a sociological approach. Likewise, markets may 
expand the discursive sphere by inviting diverse economic — and social —
 actors, such as traders, environmentalists, consumers, and regulators, to 
engage in a constructive discourse on particular issues.180
This zone of convergence can be seen, for example, in the issue of eco-
labeling (such as the labeling of items as “dolphin-safe” or “GMO-free”). 
Regulation of eco-labels may be interpreted to both promote free trade by 
increasing certainty over labeled products and serve the cause of 
environmental protection, which emerged from the discursive process of 
consumer decision-making.
  
181 Admittedly, such convergence requires 
certain conditions to be met, rendering it a special case. Eco-labeling 
works only when no market failures, such as “information asymmetries, 
externalities, and collective action problems,”182
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well informed about the issue, meaning that they lack any cognitive errors, 
such as the tendency to believe that they can predict the future based on 
their own narrow experiences (availability heuristics).183
The zone of convergence also appears when we examine the evaluative 
criteria used by the rationalist paradigm in a sociological light. For 
example, the economic efficiency that accompanies trade liberalization is a 
key yardstick for rationalism. However, that same criterion may still be 
satisfied within a sociological framework. In the so-called “ideal speech 
situation,” market participants — including not only trading nations, but 
also individual economic players — are assumed to be able to 
communicate competently enough to hold socially meaningful discursive 
exchanges that are guided by trade norms as they manufacture, transport, 
insure, forward, export, import, distribute, retail, and consume. In this 
ideal social situation, a socially well-integrated market is also likely to be 
efficient in an economic sense. Jerry Muller aptly observes that: 
 
In a commercial society based upon exchange, every man “becomes 
in some measure a merchant.”. . . The pursuit of self-interest in the 
market, with its division of labor and his resulting dependence on 
others, leads him to adapt his behavior to the expectations of others. The 
market itself is therefore a disciplining institution.184
In sum, the paradigmatic convergence between the rationalist 
(economic) and the sociological approach corresponds to a broad notion 
of rationality. Rationality refers not only to being efficient in economic 
terms (instrumental rationality), but also to being appropriate in a cognitive 
and communicative sense. Thus, an extended concept of rationality can 
embrace both the economic and the sociological framework.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argued that the rationalist framework Shaffer and 
Trachtman adopt in their analysis of the WTO cannot provide a complete 
picture of the WTO because it excludes the WTO’s social dimension. In 
response to this dilemma, the Article offered a sociological (constructivist) 
paradigm that recognizes the existence of reflective, diverse 
communication amongst WTO members that serves as a norm-building 
process. Under this new paradigm, the WTO is viewed as a community 
(Gemeinschaft) and not as a mere contractual tool to be used to carry out 
predetermined choices.  
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This Article and the sociological framework that it presents can be used 
to shed light on the current Doha crisis, which is suffering from 
mercantilist competition concerns that may be justified on rationalist 
grounds, but not on normative ones.185 Pursuing “rational” bargains may 
not deliver us to the goal of a development round. Perhaps we should 
reorient ourselves from a logic of calculation to the logic of discourse. The 
power of discourse and communication can close the gaps between trade 
norms and trade realities. Therefore, the new paradigm may disabuse 
WTO constituencies of a fatalistic yet erroneous conviction that “legal 
provisions can be nothing other than reflections of unstable and shifting 
interest constellations among powers”186 and help reinstate the 
“inspirational notions of virtue and of humans as social beings.”187 In this 
sense, the new paradigm proposed in this Article may generate a “moral” 
thesis that advocates human progress in the WTO.188
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